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 The standard account today of customary international law (CIL) is that it arises 
from the widespread and consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal 
obligation.  Although commonly recited, this account is plagued by evidentiary, normative, 
and conceptual difficulties, and it has been subjected to increasing criticism in recent years.  
This paper posits a different account of CIL, considered from the perspective of 
international adjudication.  The application of CIL by an international adjudicator is best 
understood, this paper contends, as an effort to determine the preferences of the relevant 
community of states concerning the norms that should apply in the absence of a controlling 
treaty.  Unlike the standard view of CIL, this state preferences account recognizes an 
element of judgment and creativity in determining the content of CIL, somewhat akin to the 
judicial development of Anglo-American common law.  Understanding the adjudication of 
CIL in this way, the paper contends, avoids many of the difficulties surrounding the standard 
account of CIL. 
 
Problems with the Standard Account of CIL 
The generally accepted view among international lawyers and scholars today is that 
CIL consists of the widespread and consistent practices of states that are followed out of a 
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sense of legal obligation, 1  an account that this paper will refer to as the “standard 
view.”  Under this standard view, CIL is conceived of as having two components:  an 
objective, state practice component, and a subjective, sense of legal obligation component.  
The second component is sometimes referred to by the Latin phrase opinio juris sive 
necessitatis, which translates as “a belief that something is required by law or necessity,” 
although commentators and courts often shorten the phrase simply to “opinio juris.”  This 
account of CIL has been endorsed by international tribunals, including the International 
Court of Justice,2 and it is often recited by representatives of states.3   
Despite its general acceptance, the standard view of CIL suffers from a variety of 
difficulties.  Some of these difficulties are evidentiary.  While it is accepted that one must 
show state practice and opinio juris to establish a rule of CIL, there is no consensus about 
what evidence establishes either of these two elements.  It is not clear, for example, how 
much state practice is required, or how longstanding it needs to be.  Nor is it clear how the 
beliefs of nation-states about the content of CIL are to be determined when, as is often the 
case, the states fail to articulate a position.  In addition, although adjudicators frequently 
point to treaties as evidence of CIL, the extent to which treaties constitute valid evidence of 
CIL is mysterious and controversial.4   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987); SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92-93 (2d ed. 2012); 1 OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996). 
2 See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) ¶ 55 (ICJ Feb. 3, 2012) 
(Judgment); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 
44 (ICJ Feb. 20, 1969) (Judgment). 
3  See Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, Second Report on 
Identification of Customary International Law 9-11 (May 2014), at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/66/a_cn4_672(advance).pdf. 
4 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 
213 (2010); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in 
an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010). 
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Other difficulties are practical.  There are over 190 nations in the world today, and, 
for many issues, it is challenging, if not impossible, for interpreters to determine the 
practices and beliefs of these nations.  Sometimes this is because language and other barriers 
make it difficult to access the relevant materials.  More often, it is because there simply is no 
relevant evidence in most of the countries.  Even though the standard conception of CIL 
purports to require widespread and consistent state practice, for contested issues there is 
often little state practice directly on point, and what practice there is arises from a small 
number of states.5  Indeed, actions by states often become points of controversy precisely 
because they involve new situations not specifically covered by past practice, and yet the 
standard conception of CIL seems to have little to offer in that scenario.6 
These practical difficulties may in turn help explain an empirical difficulty.  While 
adjudicatory institutions often recite the standard conception of CIL, they do not actually 
seem to follow it.  The ICJ, for example, often cites relatively little state practice in support 
of its claims about the content of CIL.7  International criminal tribunals, too, seem to find 
rules of CIL through means other than the standard account.8  And the decisions of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Even in Germany v. Italy, which had an unusually extensive discussion of state practice, the ICJ 
looked to legislation in only ten states and judicial decisions from only about a dozen states. 
6  For similar observations, see, for example, DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 198 (2010) (“[A]lthough writers claim to the traditional account of 
customary international law, they do not base their assertions about customary international law on systematic 
surveys of state practice.”), and Niels Peterson, Customary Law Without Custom?:  Rules, Principles, and the 
Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 277 (2008) (“[A] survey 
of customary international law is often highly selective and takes into account only major powers and the most 
affected states.”). 7	  See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 537 (1993) 
(noting that the ICJ “rarely presents a documented examination of the actual practice of a broad cross-section 
of the international community’s members, their opinions on the legal character of the practice, their 
knowledge of the facts that might produce new law, or their unpublicized opposition to the rule”); Richard H. 
Geiger, Customary International Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: A Critical 
Appraisal, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRUNO SIMMA 673, 692 
(Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (“In general the [ICJ] does not follow its self-proclaimed method of 
finding customary international law.”). 
8 See, e.g., William Schabas, Customary Law or “Judge Made” Law:  Judicial Creativity at the UN 
Criminal Tribunals, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 100 (Jose Doria et al. 
eds., 2009) (“[O]verall, customary international law [as applied by the international criminal tribunals] mainly 
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international adjudicatory institutions are in turn cited as themselves evidence of the content 
of CIL.9 
There are also serious and growing questions about the usefulness of CIL.  CIL 
seems structurally unable to address many of the world’s most pressing issues, such as (to 
name a few examples) climate change, international financial stability, nuclear proliferation, 
and terrorism.  For problems like these, a requirement that a substantial number of nations 
already act in accordance with the desired norm, out of a sense that such behavior is legally 
required, seems to require the impossible.10  Relatedly, the proliferation of multilateral 
treaties has raised new questions about the need for CIL as a distinct source of international 
law.  Most of the major issue areas that were historically regulated by CIL are now 
regulated, to one degree or another, by treaties.  Treaties have a variety of advantages over 
CIL, in that they provide more direct evidence of what states want (since they are the 
product of express negotiation), they can provide for greater specificity (since they are 
typically in writing), and they can establish institutional mechanisms to promote monitoring, 
adjudication, and enforcement of the norms.  In addition to multilateral treaties, nations are 
also increasingly resorting to the creation of “soft law”—that is, non-binding international 
agreements.  As with treaties, but unlike with CIL, soft law agreements are typically 
committed to writing and involve express negotiation.  The possible result of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
seems to provide a convenient license for judicial law-making, a process similar in many respects to the 
creation of judge-made rules of the English common law.”). 
9 See Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges 
and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173 (2010). 
10 These issues may also require a level of specificity and administrative structure that CIL cannot 
provide.  For an observation along these lines a half-century ago, see WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (1964) (“[C]ustom is an unsuitable vehicle for international ‘welfare’ 
or ‘co-operative’ law.  The latter demands positive regulation of economic, social, cultural, and administrative 
matters, a regulation that can only be effective by specific formulation and enactment.”). 
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developments, as Joel Trachtman has observed, may be the “increasing marginalization of 
custom.”11 
Finally, there are conceptual difficulties with the standard conception of CIL.  Many 
of these difficulties relate to the concept of opinio juris.  As Professor Hugh Thirlway 
memorably noted: 
The precise definition of the opinio juris, the psychological element in the 
formation of custom, the philosophers’ stone which transmutes the inert mass 
of accumulated usage into the gold of binding legal rules, has probably 
caused more academic controversy than all the actual contested claims made 
by States on the basis of alleged custom, put together.12 
Some scholars question whether it is even possible to find opinio juris in the pure sense that 
seems to be contemplated by the standard view.13 
 A related conceptual problem is that, even though one of the purported virtues of 
CIL is that it can evolve in response to changing circumstances, the standard view does not 
seem well structured to allow for such evolution.  The principal account of how it occurs is 
that individual nations are supposed to violate rules of CIL and then hope that other nations 
will acquiesce in the violation.14  Since the violating state by definition would not be acting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the Utility of Customary International 
Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 221, 232 (2010); see also Joel P. Trachtman, Reports of the Death of Treaty 
Are Premature, but Customary International Law May Have Outlived Its Usefulness, AJIL UNBOUND (Apr. 29, 
2014) (“CIL is increasingly ill-fitted to respond to the needs for [an] international law of cooperation.”), at 
http://www.asil.org/blogs/reports-death-treaty-are-premature-customary-international-law-may-have-outlived. 
12 H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 47 (1972); see also, 
e.g., Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International 
Law and Some of its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 532 (2004) (“[Opinio Juris] is the most disputed, least 
comprehended component of the workings of customary international law.”). 
13 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 
475 (2000) (“[T]here is no methodology that has the capacity to determine whether states have, in fact, 
accepted a norm as law.”). 
14 See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary 
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1985) (“Nations forge new law by breaking existing law, 
thereby leading the way for other nations to follow.”); Anthony D’Amato, The President and International 
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with opinio juris,15 this account appears to require a sufficiently large number of violations 
to cause the CIL rule to collapse due to lack of supportive state practice.16  Even assuming 
this is realistic, however, basing a central feature of a legal regime on widespread violations 
of the law is normatively questionable.17 
 These difficulties have made CIL ripe for criticism and rethinking.  Some 
commentators have questioned CIL’s continued usefulness and legitimacy.18  Others have 
criticized CIL for being insufficiently consensual and, relatedly, undemocratic.19  Still others 
have argued that CIL is structured in such a way that it is unlikely to produce efficient rules 
for the international system.20  As Andrew Guzman has observed, CIL is “under attack from 
all sides.”21   
These criticisms have prompted various efforts to reconceptualize CIL in a manner 
that would put it on a sounder footing.  Some scholars have suggested a focus primarily on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Law: A Missing Dimension, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 377 (1987) (“Existing customary law, then, contains the 
seeds of its own violation; otherwise it could never change itself.”); Michael J. Glennon, How International 
Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 957 (2005) (“[C]ustomary international law is thought to be altered by acts that 
initially constitute violations of old rules; that is how it changes.”).  
15 See Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, International Law 
Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 33 
(2000) [hereinafter ILA Report] (“[I]t is hard to see how a State, if properly advised, could entertain the belief 
that its conduct is permitted (or required) by existing law when that conduct is, by definition, a departure from 
it.”). 
16 See Kammerhofer, supra note 12, at 530-31.   
17 See, e.g., G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1983) (“It 
must be quite an extraordinary system of law which incorporates as its main, if not the only, vehicle for change 
the violation of its own provisions.”); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1974-75) (“There is no doubt that customary rules can be changed in this way, but the 
process is hardly one to be recommended by anyone who wishes to strengthen the rule of law in international 
relations.”). 
18 See Kelly, supra note 13. 
19 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007). 
20 See Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 
889-94 (2006). 
21 Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 116 (2005); 
see also David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary International Law, 21 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 43 (2010) (noting that this is a “time when customary international law is 
coming under attack by both extreme positivists (who suggest that its processes are illegitimate and non-
transparent) and by those of a naturalist bent (who regard it as merely pandering to state interests)”); George 
Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 541 (2005) 
(“[CIL] is under attack as behaviorally epiphenomenal and doctrinally incoherent.”). 
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state practice rather than opinio juris, 22  whereas others have suggested precisely the 
opposite.23  Some of the scholars who emphasize the state practice element seek to limit CIL 
to “old-style” CIL induced from longstanding patterns of behavior rather than “new-style” 
CIL deduced from materials such as international resolutions, treaties, advocacy by NGOs, 
and academic opinion.24  Other scholars, by contrast, have sought to reconcile and unify 
these two types of CIL reasoning.25  Still others have proposed explanations of CIL that are 
grounded in state interests and rational decisionmaking rather than in legal doctrine, while 
reaching different conclusions about whether CIL affects state behavior.26 
 
The Chronological Paradox 
One of the conceptual difficulties surrounding the standard view of CIL, which is 
referred to in the literature as the “chronological paradox,” merits special attention.  The 
paradox is as follows:  If state practices do not become binding as CIL until the states 
involved act out of a sense of legal obligation, how do the states develop that sense of legal 
obligation in the first place?  In other words, the standard conception of CIL paradoxically 
seems to require that CIL develop before it can develop, in which case we would never have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See, e.g., Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 155 (1999). 
23 Most notably, claims relating to CIL concerning human rights have tended to deemphasize state 
practice in favor of other materials.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law 
as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838-42 (1997) 
(describing this “New CIL”).  For a critique of this phenomenon, see Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The 
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST’L Y.B. INT’L L. 82 
(1989). 
24 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, A Post-Formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary International 
Law?: Some Cautionary Notes, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 57 (2010); Edward T. Swaine, Bespoke Custom, 
21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207 (2010). 
25 See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146 (1987); Anthea 
E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 757 (2001). 
26 Compare JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (2005) 
(arguing that CIL “is not an exogenous influence on state behavior”), with Guzman, supra note 21, at 130 (“As 
a matter of theory, then, CIL may be effective.”). 
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CIL.  As one scholar describes the paradox, “Nothing can be a source of new customary 
international law if opinio juris requires that any action must be in accordance with the 
existing law.”27    
Some commentators who articulate the standard view of CIL either ignore the 
paradox or treat it as if it were a mere rhetorical question that need not be answered.  The 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, for example, simply 
notes: 
There have been philosophical debates about the very basis of the definition:  
how can practice build law?  Most troublesome conceptually has been the 
circularity in the suggestion that law is built by practice based on a sense of 
legal obligation:  how, it is asked, can there be a sense of legal obligation 
before the law from which the legal obligation derives has matured?  Such 
conceptual difficulties, however, have not prevented acceptance of customary 
law essentially as here defined.28 
The Special Rapporteur for the International Law Commission’s project on the identification 
of customary international law has similarly taken note of the paradox (along with other 
conceptual problems associated with the opinio juris concept) and then simply observed that 
“the theoretical torment which may accompany [the concept of opinio juris] in the books has 
rarely impeded its application in practice.”29   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 27 Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law, 44 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 501, 504 (1995).  See also, e.g., Raphael M. Walden, The Subjective Element in the Formation of 
Customary International Law, 12 ISR. L. REV. 344, 363 (1977) (“It is not possible consistently to maintain at 
one and the same time both that custom is creative of new law and not declaratory of existing law, and also that 
it always requires to be accompanied by a belief that the conduct in question is already law.”). 
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, § 
102, reporters’ note 2.  See also, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law as a Consensual Bond, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (Malcolm Evans, ed., 2006) (“The process by which customary rules change and 
develop thus presents theoretical difficulties; but it is a process which does occur.”). 
 29 Wood, supra note 3, at 47. 
	   9 
The paradox, however, is not merely of academic interest:  it suggests that the 
standard view of CIL, although often recited, does not accurately account for how CIL is 
actually discerned and applied in practice.  Therefore, as John Tasioulas has observed, for 
legitimacy and other reasons, the paradox must be confronted “head-on.”30 
 A variety of theories have been proposed to resolve the chronological paradox, while 
retaining the standard view of CIL, but none of them seems to work.31  The most common 
theory for how CIL develops despite the requirement of opinio juris is that states initially 
make a mistake and believe themselves to be under a legal obligation even though they are 
not.32  There are at least two problems with this “mistake theory.”  First, according to most 
accounts of CIL, in order for CIL to arise, a large number of states need to believe that a 
practice is legally binding.  But, unless there is some reason to think that states (many of 
which are sophisticated actors) regularly make mistakes and, moreover, make the same 
mistakes en masse, CIL would rarely, if ever, develop and evolve.33  Second, if one assumes 
that the subset of states that makes mistakes is the least sophisticated, that means that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 John Tasioulas, Customary International Law and the Global Quest for Justice, in THE NATURE OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW:  LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 322 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & 
James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007); see also MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA:  THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 420 (2005) (orig. 1989) (noting that the paradox “is not 
merely an academic’s pet dilemma”). 
31 See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Customary International Law and the Nicaragua Case, 11 AUST’L 
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 9 (1984-87) (noting that the “paradox of the traditional theory of customary international law 
has never been persuasively resolved”); Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 662, 667 (1953) (“There is here, certainly, a challenging theoretical problem which, as far as this 
writer can see, has not yet found a satisfactory solution.”). 
32 See, e.g., VAN HOOF, supra note 17, at 99.  Geny suggested something along these lines.  See 
MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 131 (1999). 
33 See, e.g., BYERS, CUSTOM, supra note 32, at 131 (“This [mistake] approach is unsatisfactory 
because it is inconceivable that an entire legal process . . . could be based on a persistent misconception.”); 
Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 32 (1974-75) (“It is 
stretching credulity to suggest that all the many rules of customary law existing today originating on the basis 
of such mistakes.”); Hiroshi Taki, Opinio Juris and the Formation of Customary International Law:  A 
Theoretical Analysis, 51 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 447, 449 (2008) (“[I]t is strange and unreasonable to consider 
that a mistake by the acting individuals in relation to the existence of the law is indispensable in order to 
establish customary international law.”). 
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changes in the law would be driven by the least sophisticated actors, which hardly seems 
like a recipe for effective and desirable law making. 
 Another theory that has been suggested could be called the “fiat theory.”  The idea is 
that one or a small number of states purposely assert the existence of a customary rule, even 
though they do not believe that it is required by preexisting custom, and other states accept 
the claim and act accordingly.  To the extent that other states accept the claim out of a 
mistaken belief that it correctly reflects preexisting custom, this theory tends to merge into 
the mistake theory, and it has similar problems.  Another possibility is that states accept the 
claim because they are coerced into doing so by virtue of the power of the states asserting 
the claim (Imagine Britain in the nineteenth century, for example imposing CIL rules of 
admiralty law when it had the most powerful navy.)  While such a scenario is easy to 
imagine, it does not genuinely involve practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation.  
Moreover, a legal system in which a small number of states in effect impose law on the rest 
of the international community, although perhaps an accurate description of how CIL 
worked in the past, may be even more normatively problematic than the mistake theory. 
 In addition to the mistake and fiat theories, there are a variety of other theories about 
how a custom that is not initially perceived as legally binding might come to be understood 
that way, after passing through certain stages of development.34  The actual mechanism of 
this transformation, however, is not specified, so the chronological paradox is left 
unresolved.35  Other efforts to resolve the paradox involve alterations to the standard view of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 34 See, e.g., VAN HOOF, supra note 17, at 92-93; Herman Meijers, How is International Law Made?  
The Stages of Growth of International Law and the Use of its Customary Rules, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 
(1978). 
 35 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 30, at 421 (noting that the gradual ripening theory “brings in nothing 
to solve the problem” because “[w]e are still unable to reveal how the transformation from a political opinio 
necessitatis into a legally motivated opinio juris was possible”); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2014) (“The riddle remains, however, as to how this transition occurs:  if for it to 
occur requires the presence of a justified belief that it has already occurred, it can in fact never occur.”). 
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CIL.  For example, Hans Kelsen argued—contrary to the standard view—that it need not be 
established that states perceive that a practice is legally obligatory, as long as they perceive 
that it as normatively required.36  
 
Reference to Custom in the ICJ Statute 
 Before considering an alternative account of CIL, it is important to understand that 
the standard conception of CIL was not always the prevailing view, and, in fact, does not 
precisely accord with the reference to custom in the ICJ’s governing statute.  Article 38(1) 
of the ICJ Statute lists the sources of law to be applied by the ICJ, and it includes in the list 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”  Instead of saying 
that CIL is based on practices and opinio juris, this article says that international custom is 
evidence of practices and opinio juris.  Moreover, the phrasing seems to entail only one 
component—“international custom”—rather than two components as under the standard 
view.  Some commentators ignore these differences and simply assert that the phrasing 
articulates the standard view.37  Other commentators acknowledge the differences but 
attribute them to poor drafting.38 
In fact, Article 38(1) does not articulate the standard view, and it is not the product 
of poor drafting.  Rather, it articulates a different conception of CIL than the one that is now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 36 See KELSEN, supra note 46, at 307 (“They must believe that they apply a norm, but they need not 
believe that it is a legal norm which they apply.”). 
37 See, e.g., LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 58 (5th ed. 
2009) (contending that “the order of words [in Article 38] makes little difference”); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (2001) (“There are two key elements in the formation of a customary 
international law rule.  They are elegantly and succinctly expressed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.”). 
38 See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (8th ed. 
2012) (describing the phrasing in Article 38 as “prima facie defective”); VAN HOOF, supra note 17, at 87 
(noting that “this much criticized formulation has probably contributed to the confusion surrounding custom”); 
Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 664 (1953) (referring to 
the “extremely bad drafting of article 38(1)” of the ICJ Statute). 
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widely recited, including by the ICJ itself.  To understand this point, it is necessary to trace 
the origins of the opinio juris component of the standard view of CIL. 
A number of scholars have traced the opinio juris component to a French jurist, 
Francois Geny.39  In a treatise first published in 1899, entitled Methode d’Interpretation et 
Sources en Droit Prive Positif (Method of Interpretation and Sources of Positive Private 
Law), Geny attempted to distinguish between legally binding custom and mere social usage, 
and for the former he suggested that one look for “a feeling among the persons who practice 
it that they act on basis of an unexpressed rule which is binding for them as a rule of law.”40  
Although Geny was writing about domestic private law, the subjective element of his 
formulation is similar to the opinio juris requirement under what is now the standard view of 
CIL. 
Although suggestions are sometimes made that opinio juris has deeper intellectual 
roots, David Bederman’s book-length survey of the role of custom suggests otherwise.  As 
he explained: 
[C]ontemporary public international law’s doctrine of opinio juris bears no 
real resemblance to antecedents in Roman law, canon law, the ius commune, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See, e.g., ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1971); 
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 142 (2010); V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 144 (1997); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (6th ed. 2008); see also Peter E. Benson, 
Notes and Comments, Francois Geny’s Doctrine of Customary Law, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 267 (1982) 
(“Historians single out Francois Geny as the writer whose work crowned the nineteenth century’s analysis of 
custom and whose ideas were directly incorporated into our approach towards international custom.”).  Some 
writers, however, connect the standard view of CIL either to the German scholar Franz von Liszt (who was a 
cousin of the famous composer), or the Swiss scholar Alphonse Rivier.  See, e.g., STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE 
AMONG NATIONS:  A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (2014) (“Alphonse Rivier has been credited with 
being the first to clearly articulate this twofold picture of custom (albeit without using the actual express opinio 
juris.”). 
40 FRANCOIS GENY, METHODE D’INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF 248 (2d ed. 
1954) (transl. Louisiana State Law Institute 1963).   
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or English common law. . . .  It sits as an oddity in the law of nations, and, 
perhaps is the only thing that distinguishes the exceptional character of CIL.41  
For example, some commentators have suggested that the opinio juris concept finds support 
in Blackstone’s treatise on the laws of England,42 but in fact Blackstone merely argued that 
customs needed to have a mandatory rather than discretionary character in order to qualify 
as law, not that they had to be shown to be followed out of a sense of legal obligation.43 
Importantly, the phrasing of the ICJ Statute appears to have intellectual roots that are 
distinct from the roots of the modern concept of opinio juris.  The language of Article 38(1) 
was carried over from what had been Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ).  The initial drafting of the PCIJ statute was delegated to an 
advisory committee of jurists working in 1920, which was chaired by Baron Descamps of 
Belgium.  The committee specifically rejected a proposal by Descamps that would have 
referred to “international custom, being practice between nations accepted by them as 
law.”44  In other words, the committee rejected a description of CIL that would, like the 
standard view today, have set forth a separate opinio juris requirement.45 
The phrasing of the PCIJ Statute’s reference to custom was apparently influenced by 
the “historical school” of jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, which is generally traced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 173 (2010); see also Gerald J. Postema, 
Custom in International Law:  A Normative Practice Account, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW:  LEGAL, 
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 279, 280 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard 
Murphy eds., 2007) (noting that the “additive understanding” of CIL, whereby opinio juris is required in 
addition to practice, “is of relatively recent vintage”).  
42 See, e.g., CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (1965). 
43 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 78 (1765) (arguing that 
customs “must be (when established) compulsory; and not let to the option of every man, whether he will use 
them or no”). 
 44 See Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux of 
the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16—July 24 1920, at 306; see also BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 129 (2010). 
45 See also Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:  A 
COMMENTARY 813 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012) (noting that “the Committee of Jurists in 
1920 clearly did not have in mind a splitting-up of the definition of custom into two distinct elements”).  
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to (among others) the German jurist Friedrich Carl von Savigny.46  This school hypothesized 
that customary law emanated from a collective spirit or will of the people—a “Volksgeist.”47  
Importantly, Francois Geny—whose writings are said to be the intellectual genesis of opinio 
juris for CIL—expressly disagreed with the Volksgeist concept.48 
The Volksgeist concept has a natural law character that is probably not viable in 
today’s more positivistic legal culture.49  It also became associated to some extent with Nazi 
ideology.50  Not surprisingly, therefore, it has generally been rejected in the post-World War 
II custom literature. 51   The Volksgeist approach did, however, have one significant 
advantage over what is now the standard view:  it had an answer to the famous 
chronological paradox that has plagued the standard view of CIL.  
The approach of the historical school to CIL avoided the chronological paradox by 
hypothesizing that custom was evidence of something deeper and preexisting.  Under that 
approach, the development of a customary obligation did not depend on nations following a 
practice out of a sense of legal obligation.  Rather, the obligation would exist, and the 
custom would then arise to reflect it.  Savigny specifically recognized the need to avoid the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 308-09 (1952). 
47 See ILA Report, supra note 48, at 32; see also Walden, supra note 27, at 358 (“As originally 
formulated by the adherents of the historical school, the theory of opinio juris was intimately connected with 
their doctrine which saw law as an expression of the Volksgeist.”).  French legal theorists developed a 
somewhat analogous idea that custom was evidence of an underlying social solidarity (solidarite sociale).  See 
KELSEN, supra note 46, at 309. 
48 See GENY, METHODE D’INTERPRETATION, supra note 40, at 248; see also Walden, supra note 27, 
at 358-59 (noting that the modern doctrine of opinio juris is not connected to the Volksgeist concept). 
49 See KELSEN, supra note 46, at 310-11; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 30, at 415-16. 
50 See, e.g., C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (7th ed. 1964) (“Without disrespect for their scholarly 
genius, it is difficult not to feel that unconsciously (for they could hardly guess what would be built upon the 
foundations which they laid) Savigny and his followers were National Socialists before the National 
Socialists.”); CHRISTOPHER ROEDERER & DARREL MOELLENDORF, JURISPRUDENCE 127 (2004; reprinted 2007) 
(noting that the historical school “appealed to the apologistic lawyers of Nazi Germany”). 
51 See Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, supra note 38, at 664; Alan Watson, An 
Approach to Customary Law, 1984 ILL. L. REV. 561, 566.  See also Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On the Historical 
School of Jurisprudence, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 165 (2004) (presenting a more sympathetic account of the historical 
school but noting that “[e]veryone is polite to [the historical school], and no one explicitly disowns it, but no 
one really takes it seriously”). 
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chronological paradox, in critiquing what is referred to above as the mistake theory of opinio 
juris:  
[A]ccording to [this idea], the first act must have been induced by the 
necessitates opinio; consequently if it rests upon an error it must not be of 
any account at all as to the origination of customary law.  The same is true of 
the second act which now becomes the first and of the third and every 
following one.  The formation of a customary law is hence, unless one of 
those conditions is given up, wholly impossible.52 
The approach of the historical school avoided this problem, Savigny explained, because “the 
rule of law was merely manifested by the custom, not generated by it; consequently in the 
first demonstrable act the necessitatis opinio, free of all error, might and must have been 
present.”53 
 There is another important respect in which some of the earlier theories of CIL 
differed from today’s standard view.  Instead of requiring that states believe that a practice 
was already legally required, some of the earlier theories hypothesized that it was sufficient 
if states believed that a legal rule in support of the practice was necessary.  Alphonse Rivier, 
for example, wrote that “the custom or the usage of the nations is the manifestation of the 
international juridical consciousness operated by the facts that are continuously repeated 
with the sense of their necessity.”54  Such an approach appears to be consistent with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 141 (William Holloway 
transl., 1867). 
53 Id. 
54 ALPHONSE RIVIER, PRINCIPLES DU DROIT DES GENS 35 (1896). 
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broader phrase opinio juris sive necessitatis, the latter portion of which is often omitted in 
modern discussions of CIL.55 
 In sum, the standard, two-part conception of CIL has not always been the dominant 
view, and it is not fully reflected in the ICJ’s governing statute.56  A key reason why some of 
the earlier approaches died away was the shift towards positivism.  Instead of hypothesizing 
that custom is a reflection of some underlying spirit, will, or consciousness, the standard 
view today attempts to ground CIL in the actual practices and beliefs of states.  In doing so, 
however, the standard view has difficulty resolving a host of evidentiary, normative, and 
conceptual problems associated with deriving law in this fashion. 
 
State Preferences Account 
A fundamental problem with much of the theorizing about CIL, this paper contends, 
is that it fails to identify which decisionmaker it has in mind.  Instead, the discussion 
proceeds as if CIL existed in the abstract without any particular human entity to interpret 
and apply it.  As will be seen, once a decisionmaker is hypothesized, it becomes easier to 
gain traction on some of the difficulties surrounding CIL. 
 The remainder of this paper sketches an alternate account of CIL that addresses the 
chronological paradox as well as other well-known problems with the standard view of CIL.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See THIRLWAY, supra note 35, at 78 (“[T]he phrase in its entirety signifies that it is or may be 
sufficient if there is an opinio to the effect that the action (or refraining from it, as the case may be) is required 
as being, in some sense, necessary.”). 
56 For another indication that the standard, two-part conception of CIL that is prevalent today was not 
always the prevailing view, consider the fact that in attempting in 1950 to summarize the requirements for CIL, 
Manley Hudson (after having served as a judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice) identified four 
rather than two components:  “(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of 
situation falling within the domain of international relations; (b) continuation or repetition of the practice over 
a considerable period of time; (c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing 
international law; and (d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.”  Working Paper by Special 
Rapporteur Manley O. Hudson on Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, 2 Y.B. INT’L 
L. COMM’N 26 (1950). 
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Under this “state preferences” approach, the application of CIL by an international 
adjudicator should be understood as an effort to determine the preferences of the relevant 
community of states concerning the norms that should apply in the absence of a controlling 
treaty.  The paradigm adjudicatory institution considered here is the ICJ, although the 
analysis potentially applies to other institutions as well and might also apply (probably with 
modifications) to domestic courts applying CIL.   
Under this account, adjudicators look to state practice as well as to the articulated 
views of states in ascertaining state preferences, but they are able to recognize rules of CIL 
through reasoning that does not conform to the standard view.  To be clear, the claim is not 
that this is always what happens, or that adjudicators perform this task consistently or 
perfectly.  Nor is it a claim that adjudicative institutions all have the same amount of 
discretion; they clearly do not.  Rather, the claim is that the state preferences account 
describes much of what one sees in international adjudication with respect to CIL and that it 
is a useful way of understanding what is meant by CIL in that context. 
 The chronological paradox and first violators.  The state preferences account does 
not require proof that states are already following a practice out of a sense of legal 
obligation before a CIL rule can be recognized.  Rather, a CIL rule can be recognized when 
it is evident—from state practices, statements, and other evidence—that the rule is 
something that the relevant community of states wishes to have as a binding norm going 
forward.57  To be sure, the past practices of states are still highly relevant under this account, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 For a somewhat similar perspective, see LEPARD, supra note 44, at 98-99 (arguing that “opinio juris 
be interpreted as a requirement that states generally believe that it is desirable now or in the near future to 
have an authoritative legal principle or rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain state conduct”) 
(emphasis in original).  See also ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (2013) (“When trying to determine whether a norm of customary international law 
exists, we are really trying to figure out what is optimal and sustainable between states.”); Jonathan I. Charney, 
Universal International Law, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 538 (1993) (“Certainly, those searching for norms seek to 
determine whether states that have expressed interest in a matter have reached consensus on establishing a 
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because such practices are often the best evidence of state preferences.  But, because it need 
not be shown that nations are already following a practice out of a legal obligation, the 
chronological paradox is avoided. 
 For similar reasons, the state preferences account is able to explain how CIL can be 
applied against the first violator of a norm.  If a practice is uniform and has no deviations, 
there may be no opportunity for a sense of legal obligation to develop.  When the first 
deviation occurs, however, the issue of whether the practice is legally binding suddenly 
becomes relevant.  Under the standard view of CIL, the past practice might not count, since 
it was not necessarily being followed out of a sense of legal obligation.  Under a state 
preferences approach, by contrast, the past practice would be relevant in assessing whether 
states prefer to have a binding rule governing the issue, and an adjudicator would be open to 
finding that the first deviation violates CIL.58 
This account also confirms the argument, made most famously by Bin Cheng, that it 
is possible for there to be “instant custom.”59  Traditionally, it was thought that the creation 
of CIL tended to be a longstanding process of action and reaction among states.  The modern 
view, however, is that CIL can be created quickly, and the ICJ has confirmed this 
possibility.60  Commentators note that technological changes in communication, along with 
international fora such as the United Nations, allow for much more extensive and rapid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
corresponding norm as law.”); Walden, The Subjective Element, supra note 47, at 97 (“[W]hat is involved may 
be, not a belief that the practice is already legally binding, but a claim that it ought to be legally binding.”).  
58 Cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“[W]hen, as is the case here, there is no written law 
upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, 
whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought 
before them.  In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial decisions, from the works 
of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and usages of civilized nations.”). 
59  See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International 
Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965).  
60 See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 74 (Feb. 20) (noting 
that “the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new 
rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule”); see also 
KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1993) (“At present . . . an international 
custom can arise even in a very short time.”). 
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dialogue concerning what the law is and should be.  Although this possibility is recognized 
by a number of commentators, it is not clear how it can be reconciled with the standard view 
of CIL.  It is consistent with the state preferences account, however, because there will be 
situations in which it will be possible to have a good sense of state preferences even before 
there has been enough time for specific state practices to develop. 
An oft-cited example of “instant CIL” is the Truman Proclamation in 1945.  Within a 
few years after this Proclamation, it was clear that many states accepted the claim that states 
had exclusive sovereignty over the resources in their continental shelves, even though this 
might seem to contradict the traditional principle of freedom of the seas.  If CIL developed 
this rapidly, however, it was not because there was already extensive state practice involving 
the exclusion of other states from mineral extraction on the shelves, something that was not 
even technologically possible for most states.  Instead, it was because numerous state 
declarations indicated that the relevant states preferred a CIL rule along the lines of the one 
advocated by Truman.61   As Michael Scharf has discussed in his book on “Grotian 
Moments,” there are a number of modern examples like this one in which CIL is viewed as 
developing rapidly despite the absence of extensive state practice.62 
 Principles and rules.  The state preferences account also helps makes sense out of 
the difference between general principles and specific rules, a distinction often glossed over 
under the standard view of CIL.  Sometimes—probably often—there is a generally agreed 
upon principle but no widespread practice concerning the specific issue, and the 
decisionmaker must decide whether the principle applies to that specific issue.  In that 
situation, the standard view of CIL seems to offer no help, because there is no state practice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See SUZETTE V. SUAREZ, THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF:  LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
THEIR ESTABLISHMENT ch. 2 (2008). 
62 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF CHANGE:  RECOGNIZING 
GROTIAN MOMENTS (2013). 
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directly on point, let alone state practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation.  Under a 
state preferences approach, by contrast, a decisionmaker would be free to apply the principle 
to the new set of facts.  (The possibility that a similar result could be accomplished by 
utilizing the “general principles” category of the ICJ’s jurisdiction rather than the custom 
category is considered at the end of this paper.) 
A good example of the distinction between general principles and specific rules is 
the famous Schooner Exchange decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that is said to be the 
fount of the international law of sovereign immunity.63  In that decision, the Court had to 
decide whether to accord sovereign immunity in an admiralty case to a French warship.  
There was little state practice directly on point, so the Court explained that it would be 
“necessary to rely much on general principles and on a train of reasoning founded on cases 
in some degree analogous to this.”64  The Court proceeded to invoke the general principle in 
CIL concerning the “perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,” and to 
invoke by analogy various CIL doctrines, such as the CIL governing head of state immunity 
and the CIL governing diplomatic immunity.  Despite the lack of direct evidence of state 
practice, the Court concluded that there was “a principle of public law that national ships of 
war entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception are to be considered as 
exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.”65  The Court was, in other 
words, both applying and developing CIL at the same time.  This is a common feature of 
CIL adjudication, this paper contends, but the standard account of CIL does not have an 
explanation for it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
64 Id. at 136. 
65 Id. at 145.  Cf. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 2, ¶ 57 (“Exceptions to the 
immunity of the State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign equality.”). 
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Another prominent example is the PCIJ’s decision in the Lotus case.66  There, the 
court held that Turkey did not violate international law in regulating the conduct of a French 
citizen on board a French vessel, conduct that was alleged to have caused a collision on the 
high seas resulting in the deaths of Turkish nationals.  The majority reasoned that 
“[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot . . . be presumed,” and it found no 
affirmative basis for concluding that Turkey had violated an established rule of international 
law.67  Its decision contains no significant review of either state practice or opinio juris.  
Rather, the court noted that it was aware of no relevant decisions of international tribunals 
and that the decisions of national courts that had been cited to it “sometimes support one 
view and sometimes the other.”68  Because it appeared that national jurisprudence was 
divided, the court said it need not consider such jurisprudence further because “it is hardly 
possible to see in it an indication of the existence of the restrictive rule of international 
law.”69  Most of the dissenting opinions also failed to focus on evidence of state practice or 
opinio juris; rather, they referred to propositions such as “the spirit of international law,”70 
the “consensus omnium” of the international community, 71  and the “principle” of 
territoriality.72  The two partial exceptions are the dissent of Judge Moore, which reviewed a 
number of domestic cases, and the dissent of Judge Altamira, who reviewed the legislation 
of a number of states.  Of particular relevance to this paper, Altamira concluded his dissent 
by acknowledging that when international tribunals adjudicate issues of CIL “there are 
moments in time in which the rule, implicitly discernible, has not as yet taken shape in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) (Judgment) (Sept. 7, 1927).  
67 Id., ¶ 44. 
68 Id., ¶ 77. 
69 Id., ¶ 78. 
70 Id., ¶ 100 (Loder). 
71 Id., ¶ 162 (Weiss). 
72 See id., ¶ 214 (Finlay), ¶ 226 (Nyholm). 
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eyes of the world, but is so forcibly suggested by precedents that it would be rendering good 
service to the cause of justice and law to assist its appearance in a form in which it will have 
all the force rightly belonging to rules of positive law appertaining to that category.”73  
Finally, consider the Truman Proclamation, discussed above.  Imagine if an 
international adjudicator were asked to decide the legality of the Proclamation shortly after it 
were issued.  The adjudicator would need to decide how to reconcile two competing 
principles:  freedom of the seas, and territorial control.  There would not have been any state 
practice specifically on point.  Of course, there was a practice of inaction:  states had not 
previously asserted exclusive control over the minerals in their continental shelves (although 
they had at various times made other claims concerning the seabeds of the continental 
shelves).  But that was likely due to the fact that they had no technological ability to access 
those minerals.  As in The Lotus, much would have therefore turned on the court’s choice of 
baseline:  would the United States be required to show an established practice in support of 
its claim, or would a challenger be required to show an established practice disallowing it?  
The key point is that the standard view does not help resolve such a case. 
Evidentiary issues.  The state preferences account also helps address a variety of 
evidentiary uncertainties that surround the standard account of CIL.  First, this account 
avoids artificially excluding state practices from consideration merely because they might be 
followed for reasons other than a sense of legal obligation.  For example, nations 
presumably follow many customs out of self-interest (and, indeed, one would assume that 
customs develop because they are generally in the interest of the participants), yet it is 
unclear why behavior motivated by self-interest should not count when discerning CIL.74  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Id., ¶ 316 (Altamira). 
74 See George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 541, 571 (2005) (noting that “legal obligation and self-interest are not mutually exclusive categories”). 
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Similarly, nations may follow a custom out of a sense of morality (abolishing the slave trade 
in the nineteenth century, for example), but, again, it is unclear why that should count 
against the custom qualifying as CIL, since the law and morality presumably overlap.  
Finally, many customs described today as CIL are probably followed out of bureaucratic 
habit rather than a conscious sense of legal obligation, and yet such a state of mind (even 
though not opinio juris) probably is desirable for international law compliance.75  
 There has also been much debate in the literature about whether verbal acts by states 
can be considered a form of state practice.  Those who object to such classification worry 
that these acts will end up being “double counted” as both practice and evidence of opinio 
juris. Under the state preferences account, verbal acts would certainly be considered, and the 
classification debate is unimportant, as is the worry about double counting.76  To be sure, 
verbal actions should be considered with caution, since they might simply be “cheap talk” as 
opposed to the expression of a genuine preference.  But this concern relates to the weight to 
be given to the evidence, not its relevance. 
 A state preferences account further helps explain why treaties that do not purport to 
codify CIL are nevertheless relevant to the identification of rules of CIL, a question that has 
generated significant debate and uncertainty.  Although parties to a treaty presumably have a 
sense of legal obligation to the treaty, it is not clear why treaties show that nations are acting 
out of a sense of legal obligation under CIL.77  Nevertheless, treaties are among the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75  See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:  
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).   
76 See, e.g., Maurice Mendelson, The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International 
Law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 63, 87 (Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, eds., 2008). 
77 Cf. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), ¶ 90 
(Judgment) (ICJ May 24, 2007) (“The fact invoked by Guinea that various international agreements, such as 
agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign investments and the Washington Convention, have 
established special legal régimes governing investment protection, or that provisions in this regard are 
commonly included in contracts entered into directly between States and foreign investors, is not sufﬁcient to 
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common evidence cited by courts in support of opinio juris.  Indeed, in many cases, 
including many cases decided by the ICJ, they are essentially the only evidence cited.78  The 
explanation, according to the account provided in this paper, is that adjudicators use treaties 
as evidence of state preferences.  In many cases, of course, a treaty will reveal only a 
preference for binding consenting parties, but in some cases a widely-ratified treaty might 
reveal a preference for a universal, community-wide rule.  For this and other evidentiary 
issues, a state preferences approach unifies the “traditional” inductive CIL with the 
“modern” deductive CIL.79  Relatedly, it explains why adjudicators seem to use a sliding 
scale, requiring more evidence of practice when there is less evidence of opinio juris, and 
vice-versa. 80  The reason is that both types of evidence are information about state 
preferences.   
International adjudicators also often place great weight on the agreement of the 
parties with respect to what is CIL.  It is difficult to see how this would make sense from the 
standpoint of the standard two-component view of CIL, but it makes sense from a 
preferences standpoint.  For a recent example, consider the Law of the Sea Tribunal’s 
provisional order in The ARA “Libertad Case” in 2012, which concerned the detention of an 
Argentinian warship by Ghana.  In the order, the tribunal cited no state practice in support of 
its conclusion that warships are immune from seizure under CIL.  It simply noted that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
show that there has been a change in the customary rules of diplomatic protection; it could equally show the 
contrary.”); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 
44 (ICJ Feb. 20, 1969) (Judgment) (“From [the action of states that were parties to a treaty setting forth the 
equidistance principle] no inference could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary 
international law in favour of the equidistance principle.”). 
78 See Mitu Gulati, How Do Courts Find International Custom? (draft).  This is not a particularly new 
phenomenon.  See, e.g., R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275, 275 (1965-66) (“Both multilateral and bilateral treaties are not infrequently cited as 
evidence of the state of customary international law.”).   
79 Cf. Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001). 
80 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146 (1987). 
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Argentina claimed that a treaty provision relating to this issue reflected CIL, and that Ghana 
did not dispute the existence of the immunity.81   The preferences referred to there are of 
course those of the parties to the case, not necessarily of the international community, and it 
is important to distinguish the two.  This is why this paper refers to the preferences of the 
“relevant community” of states.  That community depends in part on the nature of the 
adjudicative institution, and it will vary as between bilateral arbitration, regional 
adjudication, and a general adjudicatory body like the ICJ. 
 Consequentialist considerations.  A state preferences approach also helps explain 
why decisionmakers often take into account consequentialist considerations, such as 
considerations of efficiency and international comity, when discerning rules of CIL.  To take 
one of many examples, in the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ relied heavily on 
consequentialist considerations concerning the ability of foreign ministers to carry out duties 
on behalf of their states.82  As Professor Kirgis has noted, “[a] reasonable rule is always 
more likely to be found reflective of state practice and/or the opinio juris than is an 
unreasonable (for example, a highly restrictive or inflexible) rule.”83  Such normative 
considerations are difficult to reconcile with the standard, backward-looking account of CIL.  
But giving weight to these considerations makes perfect sense under a state preferences 
approach.  After all, the community of states presumably has a preference for rules that are 
functionally beneficial and that promote cooperation.84 	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  See The ARA “Libertad Case” (Argentina v. Ghana), ILOS, Case No. 20, Order (Dec. 15, 2012).	  
82 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, ¶¶ 53-54 (ICJ, Feb. 14, 2002). 
83 Kirgis, supra note 80, at 149. 
84  Cf. EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES:  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 203 (2002) (arguing that the international community accepts a role along these lines 
for the ICJ in certain types of cases).  See also Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer:  The 
Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457 (1985) (“Correspondingly, 
opinio juris  is no longer seen as a consciousness that matures slowly over time (and finally imparts obligatory 
force to a practice once motivated by habit, convenience, or moral sentiment), but instead as a conviction that 
instantaneously attaches to a rule believed to be socially necessary or desirable.”) 
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 Another good example of this phenomenon is the famous Trail Smelter arbitration 
between the United States and Canada in 1941, in which the tribunal held that “no state has 
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes 
in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”85  The 
tribunal did not base this conclusion on any specific state practice or opinio juris.  The 
tribunal noted that “[n]o case of air pollution dealt with by an international tribunal has been 
brought to the attention of the Tribunal nor does the Tribunal know of any such case.”  Nor 
could the tribunal find any international decisions concerning water pollution.  Instead, the 
tribunal invoked a “general principle” that states have a duty to protect other states from 
injurious acts emanating from their territories, and it  ]analogized to decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court concerning cross-border pollution issues between U.S. states.86  
 Changes to CIL.  Finally, a state preferences approach does a better job than the 
standard view of explaining how CIL changes.  As previously discussed, the only 
mechanism for change specified under the standard account is through violations of the 
norm, and these violations need to be either widespread or widely accepted in order to 
effectuate change.  This process for change seems both difficult to achieve in practice and 
normatively questionable. Under a state preferences approach, by contrast, an adjudicator 
can recognize that the deviation, along with other evidence (such as evidence of changed 
circumstances), shows that the international community no longer prefers the prior rule.   
Under this approach, one can imagine, for example, the recognition of an erosion of 
sovereign or individual official immunity based on changed normative commitments 
reflected in treaties and other materials.  Indeed, consider a shift in immunity that has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Trail Smelter Case (United States/Canada), Decision at 1965 (Mar. 11, 1941) 
86 Id. at 1963-64. 
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already taken place:  the shift during the twentieth century from the absolute theory of 
sovereign immunity to the restrictive theory.87  If an international adjudicator had been 
called to consider the validity of this shift in its early stages, the standard view of CIL 
suggests that the adjudicator should have held that it was illegal—a decision that could have 
prevented the further development of CIL on this subject.  The state preferences account, by 
contrast, allows for a greater ability to recognize and permit evolutionary changes to CIL. 
  
Potential Drawbacks 
Despite the above advantages, there are potential drawbacks associated with the state 
preferences account.  Perhaps most significantly, it envisions a quasi-legislative role for 
adjudicators, a role that naturally raises questions about the extent to which adjudicators 
have been properly charged to act in this fashion.  Critics are likely to contend that 
adjudicators should be limited to apply the law as it already exists (lex lata) rather than the 
law as it should be (lex ferenda). 
  Questions of judicial authority to develop the law are common in a domestic legal 
system, particularly in a common law system, but they are more pronounced in the 
international system that (for the most part) lacks an agreed-upon central judiciary.  A 
significant check on such authority, however, is the ability of states to withdraw 
(prospectively) from many international adjudicatory institutions.88  Moreover, under the 
persistent objector doctrine, when a rule of CIL is first recognized, it should not be applied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY:  AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 115-28 
(1984). 
88 In 1986, the United States withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in response to the ICJ’s 
decision to exercise jurisdiction in a case brought by Nicaragua concerning U.S. covert and military activities 
in that country.  In 2005, after a series of ICJ rulings against the United States concerning the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, the United States withdrew from an optional protocol that allowed the ICJ 
to exercise jurisdiction in such cases. 
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to states that have clearly disagreed with the rule.  Although not part of existing doctrine, it 
might also make sense to allow for subsequent withdrawal rights for certain types of CIL 
rules.89  In any event, states can override CIL rules as between themselves by treaty, as long 
as the rules do not have the status of jus cogens norms.  More generally, literature on 
international courts suggests that, even when they act creatively, these courts are constrained 
in a variety of ways.90   
 The concern about judicial lawmaking can also be reduced by limiting the 
precedential effect of international adjudicatory decisions.  For example, it may make sense 
to give greater emphasis to the fact that ICJ decisions are technically binding only on the 
parties and thus should not automatically be treated as the last word by the international 
community on the content of CIL.91  The modern “fragmentation” of international law and 
institutions may make this easier by allowing for greater variation in judicial claims about 
the content of CIL.92   
Another reason to allow for such variation in claims about CIL, and to limit the 
precedential effect of determinations of CIL, is that there is inherent tension between 
centralized adjudication and the maintenance of a system of customary law.93  As noted 
above, one of the purported virtues of custom is that it can continue to evolve in response to 
changing conditions.  Judicial decisions concerning its content, however, have the potential 
to stifle such evolution if states end up coordinating around the decision.  This potential is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See Bradley & Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, supra note 4; Andrew T. Guzman, 
Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 169-71 (2005). 
90 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, and Chrisanthi Avgerou eds., 2013). 
91 See UN CHARTER, art. 94(1) (requiring that each member of the United Nations comply with any 
ICJ decision “to which it is a party”). 
92 See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Disaggregating Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 191, 195-96 (2012).  A much-discussed example is the different standards adopted by the ICJ and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia concerning state responsibility.  See id. at 196. 93	  See, e.g., Suzanne Katzenstein, International Adjudication and Custom Breaking by Domestic 
Courts, 62 DUKE L.J. 671 (2012).	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exacerbated by a backward-looking approach to CIL, as called for by the standard view, 
which envisions that changes to CIL require violations of the norm.  In Germany v. Italy, for 
example, the ICJ concluded that there was no jus cogens exception to state sovereign 
immunity.  It may well be that this decision was proper even under a state preferences 
account of CIL.  But if states feel constrained by that decision, or other adjudicatory 
institutions feel obliged to follow it, evolution that might otherwise have occurred towards a 
jus cogens exception may be stifled.94 
Another objection that might be raised against the state preferences account is that it 
is too positivistic—that is, its conception of how adjudicators should apply CIL is too 
dependent on what states want rather than, say, the demands of international justice.  As an 
initial matter, it is worth keeping in mind that, like the standard view, the account here does 
not depend on the consent of individual states.  Instead, the reference point, at least for 
general adjudicatory institutions like the ICJ, is the international community overall.  (The 
reference point may be narrower for regional institutions and ad hoc arbitration.)  In 
addition, this account is actually less positivistic than the standard view, since it is not as 
dependent on states already acting out of a sense of legal obligation.  Indeed, one reason that 
there has been a proliferation of proposed “modern” approaches to CIL is that the standard 
view does not seem well suited to the protection of human rights, given the frequent 
divergence between international aspirations and international practice.   
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  This point suggests that the European Court of Human Rights probably went too far in concluding, 
in Jones v. United Kingdom, that the ICJ’s analysis of the CIL of sovereign immunity in Germany v. Italy 
“must be considered by this Court as authoritative.”  Case of Jones and Others v. The United Kingdom ¶ 198 
(Judgment) (Jan. 14, 2014).	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Some commentators have acknowledged that when international adjudicators purport 
to identify rules of CIL they often do not seem to be applying the standard, two-component 
view, but these commentators contend that this phenomenon should be labeled as the 
application of “general principles” rather than the application of CIL.95  The objection to 
using the label “customary international law” appears to be at least partly linguistic:  in the 
absence of state practice in support of a CIL rule, it seems strange to refer to the rule as 
being “customary.”  As Robert Jennings critically observed, “most of what we perversely 
insist on calling customary international law is not only not customary law:  it does not even 
faintly resemble a customary law.”96  Moreover, the ICJ Statute, these commentators point 
out, specifically distinguishes between the application of international custom and the 
application of general principles.97 
 It is certainly true that the standard view of CIL has difficulty capturing the way in 
which international adjudicators identify and apply general principles when deciding cases, 
even though adjudicators often purport to be doing this under the general umbrella of CIL.  
It is unclear, however, how much would be gained by simply shifting the account of this 
phenomenon to a different label.  The same concerns about judicial law-making, for 
example, would continue to exist.  Moreover, the general principles category referred to in 
the ICJ Statute has traditionally been thought to be primarily a reference to gap-filling rules 
derived from common features of domestic legal systems (such as concerning remedies and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 See, e.g., BODANSKY, supra note 6, at 199-203; Simma & Alston, supra note 23, at 102; Peterson, 
supra note 6. 
96 Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:  TEACHING 
AND PRACTICE 3, 5 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982). 
97 See ICJ STATUTE, art. 38(1)(c). 
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defenses), rather than primary rules of international conduct, so it is not clear how well 
suited it is taking on a broader role.98    
 In any event, the deficiencies with the standard view of CIL do not primarily concern 
difficulties in articulating general principles, such as “freedom on the seas,” “territorial 
integrity,” or “equality of states.”  Instead, the difficulties come in attempting to reconcile 
potentially competing principles and in applying the principles to specific fact patterns.  This 
is what international adjudication typically requires, but the standard view of CIL often fails 
to describe how judges go about it.  Simply positing a separate category of general 
principles that do not depend on the standard view of CIL does not seem to advance the 
analysis concerning the application of such principles.  This paper contends that a state 
preferences account, by contrast, does help to advance the analysis. 
*     *     * 
 As noted at the outset of this paper, there are increasing doubts about the usefulness 
and viability of CIL as a source of international law, making this an especially appropriate 
time to rethink some of the assumptions concerning the operation of CIL in theory and 
practice.  In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that the claim here is not only that a state 
preferences approach is a better account of how CIL adjudication should work.  It is also a 
claim that it is a better description of how it already does work in institutions like the ICJ.  
These institutions may recite the standard view of CIL, but they do not actually follow it in 
practice. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 98 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  POLITICS AND VALUES 40 (1995) (“It is a source 
available only as necessary for interstitial use, to fill out what international law requires but has not recognized 
as customary law because it has not yet been invoked often and widely enough, and it is too cumbersome for 
the system to negotiate by multilateral treaty.”); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 52 (1995) (“The international cases show such use [of the general principles category] in a limited 
degree, nearly always as a supplement to fill in gaps left by the primary sources of treaty and custom.”).  The 
intended scope of the general principles category is unclear from the PCIJ drafting history.  See Giorgo Gaja, 
General Principles of Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rudiger 
Wolfrum ed., 2008). 
